Abstract. Primary Health Networks (PHNs) are a new institution for health systems management in the Australian healthcare system. PHNs will play a key role in mental health reform through planning and commissioning primary mental health services at a regional level, specifically adopting a stepped care approach. Selected PHNs are also trialling a healthcare homes approach. Little is known about the systems levers that could be applied by PHNs to achieve these aims. A rapid review of academic and grey literature published between 2006 and 2016 was undertaken to describe the use of systems levers in commissioning primary care services. Fifty-six documents met the inclusion criteria, including twelve specific to primary mental healthcare. Twenty-six levers were identified. Referral management, contracts and tendering processes, and health information systems were identified as useful levers for implementing stepped care approaches. Location, enrolment, capitation and health information systems were identified as useful in implementing a healthcare homes approach. Other levers were relevant to overall health system functioning. Further work is needed to develop a robust evidence-base for systems levers. PHNs can facilitate this by documenting and evaluating the levers that they deploy, and making their findings available to researchers and other commissioning bodies.
that facilitates the delivery of least intensive, most appropriate, evidence-based treatments to patients according to their level of need (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 2011; Australian Government Department of Health 2015b). In addition, following recommendations from the Primary Health Care Advisory Group in 2016, and as part of broader primary healthcare system reforms, a healthcare homes approach is being trialled in selected practices across 10 PHNs (Health Care Homes Implementation Advisory Group 2016; Primary Health Care Advisory Group 2016). Healthcare homes are a model of integrated, technologically enhanced, primary healthcare service, where co-located providers take responsibility for coordinating care and providing multidisciplinary services for eligible patients (Cummins et al. 2007; Ferrante 2010; Moore et al. 2014; Wilks et al. 2015; Primary Health Care Advisory Group 2016) .
Systems levers
Systems levers are a means by which PHNs can fulfil the imperative to influence the Australian health system (Australian Healthcare and Hospital Association 2015a, 2015b) . No bespoke definitions or frameworks exist to guide PHNs in effectively using levers to achieve health system change.
One framework for understanding the levers that governing bodies have at their disposal is provided by Roberts et al. (2009, p. 127) , who defined policy levers as: 'features of the system and strategies that governments can use in each arena to improve health sector performance'. They proposed a typology of five levers that can be applied by governments to deliver reform. The framework proposed by Roberts et al. (2009) has been successfully adapted for analysing Australian mental health reforms at a national level (Whiteford 2011; Grace et al. 2015; Meurk et al. 2016) , and is potentially extensible to describing levers that can be employed by local health organisations (Table 1) .
Aims
The primary aim of this rapid review was to identify and describe the systems levers that could be used to commission primary mental healthcare in a way that supports stepped care and healthcare homes approaches. The secondary aim was to adapt typology of policy levers proposed by Roberts et al. (2009) to describe systems levers relevant to regional level health governance.
Methods

Search strategy
The search comprised an academic database search and a grey literature search. Academic databases searched were: ProQuest Social Science, and Medline and PsycINFO (by Ovid). Search strings using Boolean operators took the form of 'lever terms' AND 'primary mental healthcare model terms' AND 'country terms' (Table 2) . Lists of terms were internally connected by an OR operator. For the grey literature search, source documents were obtained from a pre-defined list of websites of government health departments, think tanks, online repositories and mental health professional bodies in countries with health systems comparable to those in Australia (Appendix 1). Health-specific websites were searched for the terms lever(s). Generalist sites were searched by adding the term 'health' to the search string, in order to restrict search results to health topics only. Reports that could be downloaded in PDF or DOC or DOCX formats were included for screening. Additional sources were identified through reference lists, citation searches and materials known to the authors.
Inclusion criteria
Following initial scoping of the literature available, we decided to take an inclusive approach. Documents were included if they explicitly or implicitly discussed levers, as defined by Roberts et al. (2009) , and related to the commissioning of any healthcare services in a way that was relevant to primary mental healthcare. Inclusion criteria were: (1) the document was in English and about Table 1 . Definition of five policy lever types relevant to national level mental health reforms Source: Grace et al. 2015 Lever type Description Organisation Macro-level changes in location, magnitude, co-ordination and diversity of human and physical capital Regulation Enforced changes in behaviour Community education Spreading of information to influence changes in behaviour Finance
Revenue generation and the allocation or distribution of funds Payment System of incentives for health providers a high-income country or countries with health systems that are comparable to Australia's in terms of governance, financing and the organisational role played by primary care, and are known to have implemented or piloted primary mental healthcare models at a national or state or provincial level. These included, but were not limited to, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and the Netherlands (Bywood et al. 2015; Mossialos et al. 2016) ; (2) the document was published between 2006 and 2016; (3) the document described, implicitly or explicitly, the application of any levers in the context of commissioning any healthcare services, except as identified in the exclusion criteria below; and (4) the document presented an analysis of primary data or described or reviewed previous or current approaches. Exclusion criteria were: (1) analysis of levers focused on national level reform or levers outside the sphere of PHN influence (e.g. local health networks as a lever of national reform, national responses to workforce issues); and (2) documents focused on levers relevant to laboratory testing, aged care homes, end-of-life care, prison care, population-level prevention and promotion, secondary care, integration between health and social services, or prescribing and pharmacy.
Screening and data extraction
Documents were initially excluded through title and abstract screening (title and executive summary screening for reports).
Further exclusions occurred as analysis proceeded. Basic characteristics of each document were extracted from each source, specifically: Author/Year; Study type; Area of health; Levers identified; and Brief summary of the document, including information about country of focus and specifics of models or programs where levers were discussed. Classifications for area of health were: Primary mental healthcare; Primary healthcare; Mental health, other; and Health, other. Evidence regarding the outcomes of applying levers was extracted, if reported.
Document classification
Documents were classified according to their methods: qualitative, quantitative, mixed methods, review or position paper (categories adapted from Gardner et al. 2016) . One descriptor was allocated per document. Given that the aim of this article was to identify levers, we did not apply quality criteria or bias assessment tools.
Analysis
A deductive-inductive approach to classifying lever types and sub-types was undertaken, as follows: C. Meurk sorted literature into categories according to each of the five lever types given in Table 1 (deductive analysis) . This typology was adapted as new categories of lever became apparent and initial ones were identified as irrelevant to regional health governance (inductive analysis). As this process unfolded, previously categorised literature was re-read and re-sorted as necessary. This process was interpretive and occurred in tandem with the extraction, analysis and synthesis of lever descriptions, and descriptions of their significance and use. Where levers could be multiply assigned, they were classified according to a primary mechanism -what has been termed a 'leading edge' approach to classification (Grace et al. 2015) . Supporting levers were documented. A sample of 10 references was cross-checked by E. Wright and discrepancies in the classification of levers were resolved through negotiation between C. Meurk and E. Wright. A narrative synthesis of results included an appraisal of the relevance of levers with respect to key challenges for implementing stepped care, such as service integration, teambased care and continuity of care, where possible. Priority in interpretation was given to documents that evaluated the use of levers most relevant to the primary mental healthcare context and to an Australian context.
Results
Search results
The search resulted in 56 documents being included in the narrative synthesis (Fig. 1) .
In total, 39 of the 56 documents focussed on primary healthcare, 12 on primary mental healthcare, 1 focussed on other areas of mental health, and 4 focussed on other areas of health (Table 3) . Twenty-seven documents were classified as using qualitative methods, nine as using quantitative methods and five as using mixed methods. A further 13 documents were classified as reviews and 2 as position papers.
Classification of systems levers
Six lever types and twenty-six different levers were identified. Organisation levers were identified in 19 documents, engagement levers in 17 documents, enforcement levers in 9 documents, information levers in 18 documents, technology levers in 11 documents, and finance and payment levers in 14 documents. Table 4 defines and identifies these lever types, the correspondence between the new typology and the typology proposed by Roberts et al. (2009) , a justification for the changes made, and a list of specific levers that were mapped to each lever type.
Use of systems levers for commissioning mental healthcare
For each lever, Table 5 summarises its application(s) in the context of primary mental healthcare, its significance and use, and supporting levers (i.e. levers that are used in conjunction with the principle lever). Additional detail is given below.
Organisation
Organisation levers aim to directly influence the structure of healthcare organisations, the workforce, the organisation of help seekers with respect to available services in time and space, and features that facilitate effective organisational cultures. Several of the organisation levers that were identified in the review (namely, leadership, nursing and contracting external support) were considered to be important to health systems functioning and primary care, as opposed to being only relevant to mental healthcare.
Referral management was identified as being particularly important to implementing a stepped care approach to mental healthcare (Bywood et al. 2015) . Within Australia, GP referrals and mental health treatment plans are the most common referral pathways used to facilitate primary mental healthcare (Harris et al. 2010; Bassilios et al. 2013) . GP mental health plans followed by vouchers and third party brokers have been the most common way to facilitate referrals to psychologists (Bassilios et al. 2013; Bywood et al. 2015) . More recent innovations are technological and include web-based portals that can assist GPs to assess, manage and appropriately refer patients (WentWest Ltd 2015) .
Enrolment with a primary care provider was identified as relevant to implementing a healthcare homes model, and a potential facilitator of achieving improved outcomes for people with complex needs (e.g. people with serious mental illness) (Douglas et al. 2009; Bywood et al. 2015) .
Engagement
Engagement refers to the activities of fostering and maintaining relationships, and dialogue, among the actors that comprise the health system. Engagement may refer to the interactions within commissioning organisations and between commissioning organisations and service providers, clinicians and public and patient groups (Naik et al. 2013; Perkins et al. 2014) . Engagement was described as a means by which commissioners could influence provider behaviour in order to improve performance (Grant et al. 2015) . Franx et al. (2013) identified power sharing, mutual respect and two-way capacity building as key elements of engagement. Bywood et al. (2015) describe the key goals of engagement as identifying shared goals and achieving mutual benefit. Effective engagement was noted as important for enabling health professionals to act autonomously; conversely, poor relationships and communication may undermine this, creating uncertainty, frustration and inefficiency (Checkland et al. 2009; McCafferty et al. 2012; Checkland et al. 2013; Zachariadis et al. 2013) .
Successful engagement depends on stakeholder buy-in and trust, and is undermined where time pressures preclude stakeholder involvement (Naik et al. 2013; Ashman and Willcocks 2014; Smiddy et al. 2015) . Financial incentives or contractual obligation may be required to facilitate engagement (Box 2009; Smiddy et al. 2015) . Engaging people with lived experience of mental illness was highlighted as being particularly important to implementing integrated care (Bywood et al. 2015) . Effectively engaging referrers (e.g. GPs, emergency departments) was a key facilitating factor in the successful operation of Australia's Access to Allied Psychological Services (ATAPS), a major primary mental healthcare program implemented from 2001 to 2016 (Bassilios et al. 2013) .
Enforcement
Engagement may be viewed as dovetailing with and offsetting the excesses of the so-called 'hard' levers (i.e. enforcement levers) (Chambers et al. 2013; Grant et al. 2015) . In contrast to 'soft' levers like engagement -that are used to improve performance but do not possess sufficient power to hold underperforming organisations to account -'hard' levers provide a sanction-backed means of compelling action by incentivising compliance and deterring deviance (Addicott 2014; Grant et al. 2015; Schwartzkoff and Sturgess 2015; WentWest Ltd 2015) . Hence, enforcement is also linked with finance and payment levers. Although legally backed agreements are necessary in enabling commissioning organisations to hold underperforming organisations to account, competitive approaches (defined as 'rivalry in the market, striving for custom between those who have the same commodities to dispose of' (OED Online 2017)) or overly legalistic approaches to management were seen to run the risk of undermining engagement, goodwill and cooperation (Addicott 2014; Grant et al. 2015; Schwartzkoff and Sturgess 2015) . Having an emphasis on contestability ('the credible threat or possibility of competition'; Schwartzkoff and Sturgess 2015, p. 31), rather than competition, was described as a means to offset these negative effects (Grant et al. 2015; Schwartzkoff and Sturgess 2015) . An evaluation of the ATAPS program found that retention of mental health professionals by contractual arrangements was viewed as disadvantageous, relative to retention by employment, from the point of view of mental health professionals (Bassilios et al. 2013) . In particular, retention by employment was believed to offer greater continuity of care in comparison to contracting (Bassilios et al. 2013) . Retention by contracting was deemed to be cheaper for commissioners of services as it allowed them to externalise costs to mental health professionals and was seen to be advantageous in offering greater choice of provider to referrers and patients (Bassilios et al. 2013) .
Information
The information lever encompasses the collection, analysis, dissemination and exchange of information. Information can influence a system in multiple ways and is critical to evidencebased practice, performance management, accountability and quality improvement (Perera et al. 2013; Ashton 2015; Ham et al. 2015) . Information is also important to making resource allocation decisions, fostering inter-organisation engagement, and engaging and fostering trust among stakeholders and the broader community (Franx et al. 2013; Perkins et al. 2014; Bywood et al. 2015; Ham et al. 2015) . Information levers link with technology levers and payment levers, especially pay-forperformance approaches.
Successful use of data to inform commissioning is dependent in equal measures on technical skill and stakeholder support of data collection activities (Perera et al. 2013; Ashton 2015; Samra et al. 2015; Ball et al. 2016) ; poorly selected performance indicators run the risk of negatively affecting performance (Jacobs et al. 2006) . Tremendous effort has been expended in Australia to establish high-quality routine data collection of mental healthcare processes and outcomes, as well as to develop the mental health research workforce (Bywood et al. 2015) .
Information overload was described as posing a key barrier to implementing evidence-based practice, including decommissioning ineffective practices (Shepperd et al. 2013) . To address this issue, systems to effectively manage the quantity of evidence, and monitor and implement evidence-based practice are needed (Shepperd et al. 2013) . Lack of knowledge and skills have disproportionately negative effects on addressing the health needs of marginalised groups and minorities (Salway et al. 2016) . It was noted that dissemination activities that involve providing negative feedback may cause hostility, and should be approached with sensitivity (Ball et al. 2016) .
Technology
Technology is a lever for improving the efficient and effective functioning of the health system. It is closely related to the information levers and a necessary pre-requisite for the successful use of several other levers (e.g. organisation, enforcement, and finance and payment levers). Technology includes the use of health information systems, web portals, data visualisation tools and decision support tools. Health information systems, including electronic medical records, are a tool for improving data collection and increasingly a part of facilitating effective referral management, thus they are important to promoting service integration and continuity of care (Franx et al. 2013; Bywood et al. 2015) .
Effective use of health information systems was described as enabling GPs to occupy the centre of a healthcare home model, even when services are not co-located, thus facilitating patient choice of provider (WentWest Ltd 2015) . Decision support tools include the technologies mandated for use by the Australian Government (e.g. needs assessment), but can include several other tools -such as health technology assessment -which, although less often used, may enable effective commissioning (Elston and Stein 2007; Robinson et al. 2012; Goodwin and Frew 2013) .
Finance and payment
Finance and payment act as levers by providing the resources necessary to fund healthcare activities. Several mechanisms for financing and payment were identified, including targeted marginal investment, block funding, case-based funding, capitation, fee-for-service and pay-for-performance (also referred to as payment by outcomes). Different models of payment reflect different trade-offs between administrative simplicity and target Encompasses the co-location of healthcare services, location of these services in easily accessible areas (e.g. close to public transport) and appropriate opening hours tied to location factors (Breton et al. 2011; Bassilios et al. 2013; Bywood et al. 2015) . For example, headspace is a model of mental health services delivery based on co-location (Hilferty et al. 2015) . Significance and use Necessary but not sufficient to achieve shared care, integrated services, continuity of care and referral (Bywood et al. 2015) . Co-location of headspace with other youth services may encourage service access (Hilferty et al. 2015) . Conversely, separation of GPs from other mental health professionals facilitates greater patient choice of mental health professional and is appropriate for those concerned with privacy or stigma (Bassilios et al. 2013 ).
Supporting levers
Engagement. Collegial and collaborative relationships among service providers who are co-located must exist (Bywood et al. 2015) . Finance and payment. Incentives, including financial incentives (Breton et al. 2011; Bywood et al. 2015) , have been used to encourage healthcare professionals to relocate as needed . Enforcement. Contracts can be used to codify the agreed-upon organisational make-up of primary care organisations and to retain mental health professionals (Breton et al. 2011; Bassilios et al. 2013) . Enrolment A Description
Registration of patients with a primary care practice (Douglas et al. 2009 ).
Significance and use
Facilitates a healthcare homes model, encourages continuity of care and makes GPs key gatekeepers to other mental health professionals (Bywood et al. 2015) .
Supporting levers
Engagement. Enrolment may be facilitated through direct contact of nonenrolled help seekers (i.e. by phone, email, post or emergency room consultation) (Breton et al. 2014) . Finance and payment. Financial incentives can encourage enrolment. For example, payments for successful enrolment (Breton et al. 2014) . Finance and payment. Capitation facilitates enrolment (Bywood et al. 2015) .
Capitation tied to patient outcomes and weighted according to case complexity, may be beneficial for patients with chronic or complex needs (Douglas et al. 2009 ). Organisation. Task shifting to nurses (and other allied health professionals) can free up physician time so that clinics can increase patient load (Breton et al. 2011 ).
Referral management B Description
Includes direct referral by a GP to a mental health professional (e.g. psychologist), use of mental health plans, vouchers, self-referral and third party referral management systems (Gyani et al. 2011; Bassilios et al. 2013; Bywood et al. 2015; Edwards et al. 2015; Ball et al. 2016 ). Significance and use Central to implementing a stepped care approach (Bywood et al. 2015) . Provides a point of data collection that is valuable to commissioners (Ball et al. 2016) . Self-referral may be advantageous in facilitating access to evidence-based low-intensity therapies (such as self-guided, Internetdelivered cognitive behavioural therapy) and in stimulating mental health service use among underserved populations (e.g. people living in rural areas or cultural minorities; Gyani et al. 2011) . GPs may refer patients because of perceived lack of skills in mental healthcare rather than patient need (Gask et al. 2008) . Benefits of referral management centres are time savings, resulting from outsourcing the administration of referral but lack of evidence to support their cost-effectiveness (Ball et al. 2016) . Referral management centres can undermine clinician autonomy and cause delays (Ball et al. 2016 ).
Supporting levers
Information. Referral data can influence GP referral behaviour by feedback and improve future commissioning (Ball et al. 2016) .
Engagement. Stakeholder buy-in, including effective communication, is
important to the success of referral management centres (Ball et al. 2016) . Technology. Effective health information systems can support referral management activities (Ball et al. 2016) .
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Systems levers for primary mental healthcare Australian Journal of Primary Health Ltd 2015) . External support is most effectively utilised when there is clarity of purpose, and providers are used to implement new ideas, skills, tools or processes . Tendering prior or in order to clarify aims, using consultants to fill core roles, and lack of capacity (i.e. skills and expertise) among contractors undermines the value of external support (Naylor and Goodwin 2011; Petsoulas et al. 2014) . Concern for loss of institutional memory and relationships is a barrier to using external support (Naylor and Goodwin 2011; Petsoulas et al. 2014) . Effective performance management is necessary .
(continued next page) Allows managers to exercise effective leadership and familiarise themselves with the day-to-day running of services. Enables quality improvement activities and provides opportunities for commissioners to listen to service provider concerns (McCafferty et al. 2012; Zachariadis et al. 2013; Breton et al. 2014; Perkins et al. 2014; Grant et al. 2015) . Supporting levers -Meetings and focus groups
Description -
Significance and use
Method for facilitating engagement with commissioning, especially GPs and specialists (Naik et al. 2013; Perkins et al. 2014) . Medical specialists are often time poor and appreciate if the purpose of meetings is made clear (Naik et al. 2013) . Terms of reference and providing a larger number of smaller meetings maximises opportunities to participate (Naik et al. 2013 ). Supporting levers -Advisory groups Description Consultative committees comprising clinicians or patients . Significance and use Clinician advisory groups can provide expert opinion to support treatment delivery and services planning (Franx et al. 2013) . Public and patient involvement (PPI) can facilitate services design (Box 2009 ). Patient Participation Groups (PPGs) that operate at an individual service level can carry out health promotion activities, provide patient perspectives and, in some cases, influence commissioning (Box 2009 ). There is little evidence to support the purported benefits of public and patient involvement (Petsoulas et al. 2015) . Perceived capacity and capability can hinder GP engagement (Ashman and Willcocks 2014) . Opportunity and attitudes can facilitate engagement (Ashman and Willcocks 2014) . Some primary care organisations include patient and clinician representatives, along with other stakeholders, on boards of governance (May et al. 2008) . Within Australia, some PHNs have established similar models, such as the Clinical Council and Community and Consumer Advisory Committee (WentWest Ltd 2016) . A challenge to PPI is attracting willing participants, although patient interest may exceed participation in commissioning (Box 2009 ). The effectiveness of PPI may be undermined by lack of clarity or direction and lack of opportunity to engage meaningfully with organisational issues .
Supporting levers
Finance and payment. Commissioning organisations can incentivise enlistment of patient representatives on their board of governance (Box 2009; Smiddy et al. 2015) . PPI needs to be appropriately resourced (Petsoulas et al. 2015) . Enforcement Contracts B Description Legally backed agreements between commissioners and service providers. A variety of contract types exist, including: prime contracts, alliance contracts, high-trust contracts and partnership contracts (Addicott 2014; Schwartzkoff and Sturgess 2015; WentWest Ltd 2016) . Significance and use Different contract types may have distinct influences on the system. They vary according to: the extent to which they encourage collaboration versus competition between service providers; the obligations the contract creates between commissioner and supplier (e.g. delivery of activities, outcomes or financial accountability); the way that they distribute risks, control and responsibility between and across commissioners and providers, and; the levels of administrative burden they place on commissioners or providers (Addicott 2014; Schwartzkoff and Sturgess 2015) . Overly detailed or legalistic contracts, and those that are unduly focussed on financial
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Systems levers for primary mental healthcare Australian Journal of Primary Health (Schwartzkoff and Sturgess 2015) . Poor use or overuse of the contract lever may lead to loss of trust and work-to-rule, thus having detrimental effects on sector performance (Schwartzkoff and Sturgess 2015) . Short-term contracts may generate instability and volatility in the workforce that could have negative effects on performance (Schwartzkoff and Sturgess 2015) . Alliance contracts and high-trust contracts may be most suitable to improving mental health systems (Addicott 2014; Schwartzkoff and Sturgess 2015) .
Supporting levers
Engagement. To mitigate the negative effects of contracts, contract levers should be used within a context of effective relationship management and communication (Addicott 2014) . Information. Contracts based on achieving particular throughputs or outputs require that appropriate data collection and analysis takes place (Schwartzkoff and Sturgess 2015) . Tendering B Description
Competitive application processes by which services are procured. Significance and use
Used as a means to improve cost-effectiveness of services delivered. One qualitative study indicated that managers believed competition enhanced quality of care (Grant et al. 2015) . However, another study highlighted the risk that competitive tendering may create instability and other negative effects, if short-term competitive contracts are issued (Schwartzkoff and Sturgess 2015) . Short-term tenders may result in a rapid cycling of providers and cause confusion on the part of patients when navigating the mental health system (Schwartzkoff and Sturgess 2015) . Focussing on contestability -'the credible threat or possibility of competition' -rather than competition, may offer a better foundation for procurement (Schwartzkoff and Sturgess 2015; p. 31 Generally, focussed on performance improvement and management (Chambers et al. 2013; Grant et al. 2015) . A Cochrane review found insufficient evidence from which to assess the effectiveness of external inspection on compliance with systems, behaviour or patient outcomes (Flodgren et al. 2011) . Additional strategies that commissioners can use, include task sharing, 'appeal to authority', and strategic selection of stakeholder involvement and commissioning frameworks (Chambers et al. 2013) . Targeted feedback and supported reflection can also be used as part of quality management initiatives (Phillips et al. 2010 ).
Engagement. Site visits, as a form of soft governance, allows for constructive rather than punitive measures to be taken in response to poor performance, although too much surveillance may erode provider autonomy (Grant et al. 2015) . Negotiation, conflict management and high-trust relationships are necessary skills and qualities (Chambers et al. 2013) . Information. Information exchange and publishing performance indicators can influence provider behaviour (Chambers et al. 2013; Grant et al. 2015) . Enforcement. Soft governance may be ineffective if not sanction-backed through contractual mechanisms (Chambers et al. 2013; Grant et al. 2015) . Information Data collection and Description Data collection and analysis focused on safety, outcomes, efficiency or equity. analysis Significance and use
Useful for improving efficient communication and monitoring expenditure, safety and resource use. Thus, it may be used to enhance the costeffectiveness of commissioning and equity (Chan et al. 2010; Breton et al. 2011; Perera et al. 2013; Bywood et al. 2015; Salway et al. 2016) ; it is also a key part of performance measurement, management and improvement, and clinical governance (Phillips et al. 2010; Bassilios et al. 2013; Bywood et al. 2015; Ham et al. 2015) . Effective use of this lever is undermined by time pressures, duplication of effort, unclear or excessive data collection or reporting requirements and poorly aligned indicators (Phillips et al. 2010; Perera et al. 2013; Ham et al. 2015; Samra et al. 2015) .
(continued next page) (Ashton 2015) . Technology. Well-designed, standardised and user-friendly health information systems support data collection and analysis activities (Phillips et al. 2010; Ashton 2015; Ham et al. 2015) . Organisation. Clear delineation of roles and responsibilities for data collection and use is important (Samra et al. 2015) . Literature reviews Description Includes systematic reviews. Significance and use Provide the best evidence regarding which treatments and services are effective. Systematic reviews should play a central role in decision-making, regarding both commissioning and de-commissioning activities (Shepperd et al. 2013) . Limitations to applying systematic review evidence include difficulties in applying evidence within a local context, policy contexts that constrain the implementation of evidence-based practice, and patient and industry influence (Shepperd et al. 2013 ).
Organisation. Leadership is important for change management (Shepperd et al. 2013) . Organisational inertia can be a barrier to implementing evidence-based care (Phillips et al. 2010; Ashcroft et al. 2014) . Engagement. Good relationships are necessary for change management (Shepperd et al. 2013) . Information. Data on existing practices are important for change management (Shepperd et al. 2013) . Finance and payment. Recommended commissioning and de-commissioning activities require appropriate funding (Shepperd et al. 2013 ).
Dissemination and training
Description Encompasses the delivery of tailored feedback, distribution of newsletters, guidelines and intensive training initiatives, and capacity building (Franx et al. 2013; Perera et al. 2013; Ashcroft et al. 2014; Bywood et al. 2015; Salway et al. 2016 ). Significance and use Enable engagement and knowledge exchange within a community of practice and facilitate integration and continuity of care (Franx et al. 2013; Perkins et al. 2014; Bywood et al. 2015) . Dissemination and training ensures that individuals have the information they need to implement new strategies and perform and comply with changing requirements and evolving evidence to deliver safe, effective and equitable care (Franx et al. 2013; Perera et al. 2013; Ashcroft et al. 2014; Bywood et al. 2015; Salway et al. 2016) . Providing meaningful feedback to clinicians regarding their performance, and publicising performance indicators are an important part of fostering trust in the system and ensuring stakeholder buy-in (Samra et al. 2015; Ball et al. 2016) . However, there is a risk that negative feedback may result in disengagement (Ball et al. 2016) . Disseminating information is not equivalent to or sufficient for implementation (Gask et al. 2008; Franx et al. 2013 ).
Supporting levers
Organisation. Clear delineation of roles and responsibilities for reporting is necessary (Samra et al. 2015) . Finance and payment. Appropriate resourcing is required to support dissemination and training activities (Bywood et al. 2015) .
Publication of results
Description Publication is a special case of dissemination and is part of the 'transparency agenda' (Ashton 2015; Ham et al. 2015) . Significance and use Publishing performance data can facilitate behaviour change by stimulating underperforming individuals and services to improve their performance relative to higher performing individuals (Ashton 2015; Grant et al. 2015; Ham et al. 2015) . One study indicated that publicising performance may result in system performance reverting to the mean, as professionals seek to avoid the scrutiny associated with being an over or under achiever (Grant et al. 2015) . It is important that entities (individuals or services) are only held publically accountable for that which they are responsible (Jacobs et al. 2006; Ham et al. 2015) . Reporting on performance in an overly simplistic manner may have negative consequences for public trust and provider performance (Jacobs et al. 2006; Ham et al. 2015) .
(continued next page)
Systems levers for primary mental healthcare Australian Journal of Primary Health Significance and use Tools with multiple effects. Health information systems can improve data collection and are increasingly a part of facilitating effective referral management and thus in promoting service integration and continuity of care (Franx et al. 2013; Bywood et al. 2015) . They enable GPs to occupy the centre of healthcare homes (WentWest Ltd 2015) . Studies indicate an almost complete adoption of computerised medical records among Australian GPs (Ludwick et al. 2010) . Nevertheless, the use of health information systems is suboptimal and difficulties exist regarding system compatibility and standardisation (Pearce et al. 2013) . Factors that impede the effective use of health information systems are a lack of standardisation of coding systems for diagnosis, lack of standards governing different information systems, lack of patient access to their records, inadequate backup systems, and poor quality control (Pearce et al. 2013 ).
Supporting levers
Organisation. Effective leadership and change management is necessary for successful implementation (Silvester and Carr 2009) . Information. Training and support is necessary for uptake of health information systems (Ludwick et al. 2010) . Engagement. Professional networks support implementation (Ludwick et al. 2010) . Finance and payment. Incentives have been used to implement computerised medical records (Breton et al. 2011; Pearce et al. 2013) . One study found that the type of remuneration approach used was not associated with uptake (Ludwick et al. 2010 Geospatial analysis has been investigated as a means to visualise routinely collected health service data to inform commissioning (Noble et al. 2012) . Visualisations were found to be useful in representing data but were technically difficult to produce (Noble et al. 2012) . Supporting levers -Decision support tools Description Tools and protocols that assist commissioners in strategic, data-driven priority setting and decision-making. Decision-support technologies include: needs assessment, program budgeting and marginal analysis (PBMA), and Health Technology Assessment (HTA). Significance and use Decision support tools improve the cost-effectiveness as well as transparency of the decision-making process. Needs assessment, utilising epidemiological data, followed by predictive modelling were the most commonly reported tools used for making investment and disinvestment decisions in a survey of primary care trusts in England . Program budgeting and marginal analysis (PBMA) is another decision support tool that uses past resource allocation in conjunction with cost-benefit analysis to make future expenditure decisions. PBMA was identified as one of the least used decision-making tools, in the context of commissioning; however, it is argued that PBMA presents a satisfactory approach to priority setting Goodwin and Frew 2013) . Health Technology Assessment is mostly used to conduct assessments of pharmaceuticals, rather than to assess medical devices or other health technologies (Elston and Stein 2007) . HTAs tended to be of variable quality and often do not consider value for money (Elston and Stein 2007) .
(continued next page) et al. 2015) . Can include investment in patient enrolment with a primary care practice, professional development, attracting and retaining a skilled workforce, information technology (IT) system upgrade, implementation and decommissioning activities, and data collection Ashcroft et al. 2014; Breton et al. 2014; WentWest Ltd 2016) . Significance and use Providing one-off lump sum payments may be useful for providing the necessary capital to implement transformative changes aimed at achieving long-term gains (Franx et al. 2013 ).
Technology. Decision-support tools can be used to inform targeted investment. Block funding Description Payment of fixed amounts in 'blocks' to service providers for service provision.
Significance and use
The provider is responsible for delivering care to patients within the assigned budget (Marshall et al. 2014) . Block funding has low transaction costs, facilitates budgetary control, provides financial stability for providers, and allows for providers to innovate within the assigned budget (Marshall et al. 2014) . Drawbacks include lack of accountability for expenditure and reduced commissioner influence over providers. This model is criticised for discouraging activity (throughputs), costly innovation, and care for 'costly' patients (such as those with complex needs or chronic conditions; e.g. severe and persistent mental illness) (Marshall et al. 2014) . Supporting levers -Case-based or pathway-Description Funding paid for an episode of care. based funding Significance and use Case-based funding facilitates patient choice (Marshall et al. 2014) , encourages efficiency in care per episode and incentivises increased throughput (activity). Case-based funding enables performance monitoring across providers (Marshall et al. 2014 ). Disadvantages to case-based funding include that it risks stimulating unnecessary demand, it presents difficulties in capping expenditure and has higher transaction costs than block funding. Case-based funding may foster a decline in quality care, and there is a risk of petty fraud -where providers classify patients into more lucrative categories (Marshall et al. 2014 ). Supporting levers -Capitation A Description A fee paid to practices according to the number of enrolled patients. Significance and use Capitation is an administratively simple form of payment. It facilitates enrolment with a service provider, and so is consistent with a healthcare homes model. Capitation can also offset the shortcomings of fee-for-service models (see below) (Douglas et al. 2009 ). Capitation may reduce interprofessional competition and thus improve collaborative care Breton et al. 2011) . Capitation is often weighted according to case complexity in order to overcome disincentives to care for more complex cases (Marshall et al. 2014) . Supporting levers -Fee-for-service Description A form of activity-based funding, where payment is made to perform a service. Significance and use Fee-for-service is simpler to administer than pay-for-performance approaches (Marshall et al. 2014) , enables patient choice of care provider (Marshall et al. 2014) , incentivises uptake of technologies and services that are remunerated under a fee-for-service scheme and creates no incentives to withhold care. Key drawbacks are that it can be difficult to constrain budgets, it rewards total throughput rather than quality of care, it may result in unnecessary consultations, and it can stimulate interprofessional (continued next page) specificity, and engender different distributions of financial risk and responsibility between commissioning organisations and service providers (Marshall et al. 2014) . In practice, blended arrangements are often used (Marshall et al. 2014) . The pay-forperformance approach, which fuses financial and contractual mechanisms, was the most commonly discussed payment model in the literature reviewed, with several commentators expressing the need for caution in utilising this approach in terms of its possible deleterious effects on intrinsic motivation and continuity of care (Buetow 2008; Campbell et al. 2008; Marshall et al. 2014; Schwartzkoff and Sturgess 2015) . The success of pay-forperformance approaches depends on the ability to select and monitor performance indicators that align with, and therefore incentivise, desirable activities and outcomes that are within a provider's control and can be measured over the period of a contract (Schwartzkoff and Sturgess 2015) . Implementation of payment by outcomes that result in delays in payment or present a significant financial risk to the contractor may be detrimental to the mental health system (Schwartzkoff and Sturgess 2015) . A Cochrane review of evidence on the effect of financial incentives on the behaviour of primary care practitioners found insufficient studies to judge the effectiveness of incentives (Scott et al. 2011) . Ludwick et al. (2010) found that mode of remuneration did not affect the implementation of electronic medical records in Canada, whereas a review by McDonald et al. (2008) found inconclusive evidence linking mode of remuneration to improvements in team-based primary care.
Discussion
Effective primary mental healthcare depends on creating a system that patients can easily navigate and that is flexible to the way that (Breton et al. 2011; Marshall et al. 2014) . Rates of remuneration provided may be insufficient to provide adequate care for patients with complex needs (Douglas et al. 2009 ). Supporting levers -Pay-for-performance or payment by outcomes Description A model of payment that links financial incentives to the achievement of desired outcomes. Significance and use Pay-for-performance rewards the desired outcome directly and facilitates a high degree of commissioner control over health system outcomes (Buetow 2008) . A key limitation of pay-for-performance is its administration costs. Providers may incur substantial financial risks if payment is likely to be delayed or withheld unless and until outcomes are demonstrated (Schwartzkoff and Sturgess 2015) . Identifying suitable indicators may be challenging in mental health (Schwartzkoff and Sturgess 2015) . Pay-forperformance may be appropriate where the relationship between inputs, throughputs and outcomes are clear and accepted (Marshall et al. 2014; Schwartzkoff and Sturgess 2015) . Negative consequences may result from a misalignment between performance indicators and stakeholder goals and values. Pay-for-performance discourages elements of care that cannot be measured and it may discourage intrinsic motivation and ownership, particularly if the system of rewards is perceived as being unfair (Buetow 2008; Marshall et al. 2014) . Some studies report that pay-for-performance can improve quality of care, with respect to incentivised indicators, in the short term Franx et al. 2013; Grant et al. 2015) . In one case study, Grant et al. (2015) highlighted that there were few instances of commissioners withholding payments entirely. Cautious and staged implementation of pay-for-performance approaches within Australia's mental health sector has been recommended (Schwartzkoff and Sturgess 2015) . One study warned of detrimental effects on continuity of care ).
Supporting levers
Engagement. Pay-for-performance should be mixed with constructive quality improvement initiatives to help troubleshoot performance issues (Grant et al. 2015) . Information. The ability to implement a pay-for-performance scheme depends on the existence of suitable performance indicators that can measure performance over a timeframe that fits with the practical need to disburse funds for a contract (Ashton 2015; Schwartzkoff and Sturgess 2015) . Technology. Suitable health information systems are a necessary pre-condition for use of payment by outcomes (Marshall et al. 2014) . Enforcement. Payment by outcomes fuses contractual and payment mechanisms (Addicott 2014; Grant et al. 2015) .
A Levers that have unique significance to the implementation of a healthcare homes model. B Levers that have unique significance to the implementation of stepped care within primary mental healthcare.
symptoms and needs fluctuate. Facilitating service integration, multidisciplinary team-based care, and continuity of care are of paramount importance to achieving this. Although all levers identified in this review have applicability to PHNs with respect to their roles in improving health system functioning and primary care in general, the use of referral management, contracts, tendering and health information systems have specific implications to improving the performance of mental health systems. Effective referral management, which focusses on mechanisms for facilitating patient access to the most appropriate, least restrictive care for their symptoms, will likely be critical to achieving better system integration and continuity of care. Contractual and payment approaches, specifically those that focus on contestability rather than competition, may help foster constructive and supportive relationships across providers that are critical to achieving system stability, integration and continuity.
Health information systems can be supportive of both mental health services and a healthcare homes model of primary care. In particular, the adoption of single multi-agency care plans may be an important facilitator of integration and continuity of care (Department of Health 2016).
Importantly, lever use is context-specific and multiple levers often work together. This is important to recognise for their successful application. However, it also raises methodological challenges in terms of how levers can be evaluated in order to build a much-needed evidence base to support their use (Greenhalgh et al. 2009; Cartwright and Hardie 2012; Grace et al. 2017 ).
Strengths and limitations
The key strength of this review is that it describes a range of levers from health systems that are similar to those in Australia. There are four key limitations to note. First, the classification of content according to levers relied on judgement and interpretation. Other researchers could have classified content differently. We do not think this potential variability undermines our analysis, given that it is based on an existing framework and that we undertook cross-checking of a sample of documents. Second, in the documents included in this review, only one profession (nursing) was considered as a 'lever' (see Table 5 ). Further work needs to be done to establish where and when health professionals and the workforce should be viewed as 'levers'. Third, the literature was sparse and not necessarily based on robust evaluation methods. There is a need for further research to develop an evidence base for policy (Gardner et al. 2016) . Finally, although this review focussed on the use of levers at a single level of governance (i.e. at a regional level), in practice, levers can be enacted across multiple levels of governance. Future research on levers that cross levels is warranted.
Conclusion
This review identified 26 different levers that could be used by Primary Health Networks to influence the mental health system. Although all of these levers play an important role in health system functioning in general, referral management, health information systems, contracts and tendering models may be uniquely relevant to achieving the appropriate streaming of help seekers, service integration and continuity of care -critical success factors for a stepped care model. Enrolment, location, health information systems and capitation may be particularly important for implementing a healthcare homes model. Further reviews and primary research are needed to evaluate the use of systems levers in commissioning primary mental healthcare by local health organisations. PHNs can help build an evidence base for levers by documenting the levers that they use, evaluating their use, and making this information available to researchers and other commissioning bodies for further analysis and synthesis.
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